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RECENT CASES
one in the instant case appear to have created an artificial and un-
reasonable distinction. This distinction has caused most states to
hold that the provisions of the statutes cannot constitutionally ex-
tend to accidents involving nonresidents, who after having entered
the state proceed onto private or other public property and there
cause injury to another.
This case illustrates the importance of careful drafting of the
Nonresident Motorist Statue. To restrict the inherent danger of a
motor vehicle solely to the highway as was done in this case denies
the resident proper protection and seems to defeat the intent of the
lawmakers.
RONALD SPLITT.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -INJURIES ARISING "OUT OF" EM-
PLOYMENT- RIGHT OF TRAVELING EMPLOYEE TO COMPENSATION. -
Decedent and a female companion died in a hotel fire caused by the
careless smoking of one or both of the parties. Decedent had been
traveling on the business of his employer. The petitioners, de-
cedent's wife and minor daughter, filed a claim under the California
Workmen's Compensation Act which was denied by the state In-
dustrial Accident Commission. The California Supreme Court, two
justices dissenting, held that the death arose out of and in the course
of employment and thus was compensable under the act. Wiseman
v. Industrial Accident Commission, 46 Cal.2d 570, 297 P.2d 649
(1956).
The courts generally agree that the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Acts should be given broad construction,' and
reasonable doubts resolved in favor of the employee. 2 Recovery is
limited to injuries arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment.' The former relates to a causal connection between the acci-
dent and the employment, and the latter refers to the "time, place,
and circumstances" of the accident.
4
1. E.g., Desautel v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 72 N.D. 35,
38, 4 N.W.2d 581, 583 (1942) (dictum).
2. E.g., Truck Ins. Exchange v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n., 27 Cal.2d 813, 167 P.2d
705, 706 (1946) (dictum); Smith v. University of Idaho, 67 Idaho 22, 170 P.2d 404,
406 (1946) (dictum).
3. 6 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation § 1542 (3rd ed. 1948). Forty-one states
have statutes containing both phrases. N. Dak., Penn., Texas, and Wash. statutes con-
tain only "in the course of". N. D. Rev. Code § 65-0102, 8 (Supp. 1953) "'Injury' shall
mean only an injury arising in the course of employment." N. Dak. law contains no other
equivalent of "'arising out of" the employment as regards accidental injuries and only the
single element must be found to award recovery. Lippman v. North Dakota Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, 79 N. D. 248, 55 N.W.2d 453 (1952).
4. E.g., Lippman v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 79 N.D. 248,
252, 55 N.W.2d 453, 458 (1952) (dictum).
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The most controversy centers around the application of the
phrase "arising out of" the employment. The more liberal jurisdic-
tions, as represented by this case, require only that -the employment
be a contributing cause leading to the injury.' Under this theory
so long as the necessity for a trip is created by the traveler's em-
ployment, his engagement in personal activities incidental thereto
will not remove him from coverage under the act." A traveling em-
ployee would be put at his own risk only by deliberate violation
of rules or statutes designed for' his protection,7 willful self-inflicted
injury,' or such substantial deviation from the employment as to
make the trip primarily personal in nature.'
Many jurisdictions have adopted a more conservative view. They
reason that the legislatures did not intend to establish a general
health and accident insurance fund to cover any injury which might
befall an employee, and have required a much stronger causal re-
lationship between the accident and the employment.10 Thus under
the "foreseeability" doctrine the causal relationship between the
injury and a hazard of the employment must have been foreseeable
at the time the contract of employment was undertaken.,, The
"increased risk" doctrine requires that the injury flow from a hazard
Which is an "increased risk" of the employment, and not one to
which the public in general is exposed.' 2 These doctrines deny re-
covery for accidents which may occur in the normal course of liv-
5. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923); Employer's Mut.
Liability Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n., 41 Cal.2d 676, 263' P.2d 4 (1953); Glet-
man v. Reliable Linen & Supply Co., 128 N. J. L. 443, 25 A.2d 894 (Ct. Ern. & App.
1942).
6. E.g., Mark's Dependents v. Grey, 251 N.Y. 90, 167 N.E. 181, 183 (1929)
(dictum). Opinion by Justice Cardoza in what is considered a leading case on point.
7. See Brown v. Birmingham Nurseries, 173 Tenn. 343, 117 S.w.2d 739 (1938);
Carbon Fuel Co. v. State Compensation Comm'r., 112 W. Va. 203, 164 S.E. 27 (1932);
1 Larson, Workmert's Compensation § 32 (192).
8. Provision contained in statutes of 41 states. N. D. Rev. Code § 65-0102, 8 (Supp.
1953). "'Injury' ... shall not include an injury caused by the employee's willful "n-
tention to injure himself." For a comprehensive discussion see, 1 Larson, op. cit. supra
note 7, § 36.
9. See Whito v. South Carolina State Highway Dept., 226 S. C. 380, 85 S.E.2d
290 (1955) (deviation of 12 miles to take wife and child home held substantial in total
trip of 38 miles).
10. See January-Wood Co. v. Schumacher, 231 Ky. 705, 22 S.W.2d 117 (1929);
Permanent Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n., 380 Il1. 47, 43 N.E.2d 557, 560 (1942)
(dictum).
11. See United Disposal & Recovery Co. v. Industrial Comm'n., 291 I11. 480, 126
N.E. 183 (1920); January-Wood Co. v. Schumacher, 231 Ky. 705, 22 S.W.2d 117 (1929);
Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N.J. L. 72, 86 At. 458 (Sup, Ct. 1913); Leonard v. Granberry
Furnace Co., 150 Tenn. 346, 265 S.W. 543 (1924). This test is seldom used currently.
But see Jackson v. Clark & Fay, Inc., 197 Tenn. 135, 270 S.W.2d 389 (1954).
12. See Hill-Luthy Co. v. Industrial Comm'n., 411 Ill. 201, 103 N.E.2d 605 (1952);
Permanent Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n., 380 I11. 47, 43 N.E.2d 557 (1942); Lax-
ington Ry. System v. True, 276 Ky. 446, 124 S.W.2d 467 (1939); Nelson v. Country
Club of Detroit, 329 Mich. 479, 45 N.W.2d 362 (1951).
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ing, 3 while the same accidents might be covered in the liberal
jurisdictions."
It seems that the law governing recovery under Workmen's
Compensation Acts would be made more realistic by abandoning
the traditional tests applied by most courts and adopting the "posi-
tional risk" doctrine applied in Lawrence v. Matthews.-t This doc-
trine requires only that the employment bring the employee to the
place of the accident, and therefore allows a recovery in proper
cases without the necessity of a strained interpretation of the tra-
ditional tests.
MICHAEL E. MILLER.
13. Injuries held not compensable: Lexington Ry. System v. True, 276 Ky. 446, 124
S.W.2d 467 (1939) (stray bullet); Nelson v. Country Club of Detroit, 329 Mich. 479, 45
lf.W.2d 362 (1951) (lightning); Jackson v. Clark & Fay Co., 197 Tenn. 135, 270 S.W.2d
389 (1954) (tornado).
14. Injuries held compensable: Pacific. Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n,. 86
Cal. App.2d 726, 195 P.2d 919 (1948) (stray bullet); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n., 81 Colo. 233, 254 Pac. 995 (1927) (lightning); Harvey v. Caddo De
Soto Cotton Oil Co., 199 La. 720, 6 So.2d 747 (1942) (cyclone).
15. [1929] 1 K. B. 1 (C. A. 1928). This case is annotated in 63 A. L. R. 456.
The test has been applied in several United States cases. Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Indus-
trial Ace. Comm'n., 86 Cal. App.2d 726, 195 P.2d 919 (1948) (employee killed by
random bullet); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n., 81 Colo. 233, 254 Pac. 995
(1927) (employee struck by lightning); Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co., 199
La. 720, 6 So.2d 747 (1942) (employee killed when cyclone blew down building !n
which he sought shelter); Gargiulo v. Gargiulo, 12 N.J. 607, 97 A.2d 593 (1953) (em-
ployee struck by stray arrow); Filitti v. Leorde Holmes Corp., 244 N. Y. 291, 155 N.E.
579 (1927) (employee struck by falling object); Gioliotti v. Hoffman Catering Co.,
246 N. Y. 279, 158 N.E. 621 (1927) (employee killed in fire).
